it and for the first cases to be dismissed as a result. These cases are Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v 
. Ukraine ("Global and Globex") and RSM Production Corporation and others v. Grenada ("RSM and others").
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This development begs for an analysis of the meaning and application of Rule 41(5).
This paper provides such an analysis. Section II briefly recalls the history of Rule 41(5), summarizes the four cases brought under the Rule so far, and examines the Rule in the greater context of the ICSID Convention. Sections III and IV respectively discuss the scope of Rule 41(5) and analyze its standard of review. Section V explains the procedure for the application of the Rule, and Section VI provides some concluding thoughts.
II. RULE 41(5): HISTORy, CASES, AND CONTEXT
A. History of Rule 41(5) in Brief
The ICSID Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966. On September 25, 1967, the Administrative Council of ICSID adopted the ICSID Regulations and Rules, 4 pursuant to Article 6 of the ICSID Convention. Generally, amendments to the ICSID Regulations and Rules are driven by the Centre's desire to improve its services and increase the satisfaction of its clients. The amendments aim to update, clarify, simplify, and render more efficient the ICSID Regulations and Rules in light of feedback based on users' cumulative experience, considering ICSID's growing caseload, 6 and also bearing in mind the difficulty of obtaining unanimous approval of Contracting States to amend the ICSID Convention. 7 The 2006 amendment of the ICSID Regulations and Rules commenced with the ICSID Secretariat's publication of a Discussion Paper that proposed improvements to the framework for ICSID arbitration.
8 The Discussion Paper was followed by the ICSID Secretariat's Working Paper which presented an annotated draft of the Regulations and Rules under consideration. 9 The outcome of the process was the ICSID Administrative Council's adoption of, inter alia, Arbitration Rule 41(5).
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Specifically with respect to Rule 41(5), the ICSID Secretariat had reported that, although the ICSID Rules largely continued to meet users' needs, users had raised concerns in some areas. 11 One concern was that, while the ICSID SecretaryGeneral could refuse to register a dispute that is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, there was no similar expedited procedure for preventing a dispute 6 With respect to the 2003 amendments, Antonio Parra wrote: "With the rapidly accumulating experience, the ICSID Secretariat decided in 1999 to review the Regulations and Rules to see if there were improvements that could usefully be introduced at that stage . . . . The amendments were intended to clarify and update certain provisions, to make certain others more flexible . . . ." Antonio R. Parra More generally with respect to Rule 41(5), a trend had started in some then-recently concluded international trade agreements allowing preliminary objections that a claim lacked merit as a matter of law. The same trend also created expedited procedures for addressing such objections. For example, the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement provides that "a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made . . . ."
15 A similar provision is found in the United StatesMorocco Free Trade Agreement, the United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, and several other agreements. 16 These provisions are similar in purpose and, to an extent, share similar language with Rule 41(5). They predate Rule 41(5) and occur in trade agreements between States that are also Parties to the ICSID Convention. On these bases, introducing ICSID Rule 41(5) could well have been a means to equip the ICSID arbitration system with tools that would allow it to accommodate the substantive changes observed in these agreements.
Arbitration Rule 41(5), as adopted, provides:
Unless the parties have agreed to another expedited procedure for making preliminary objections, a party may, no later than 30 days after the constitution of the Tribunal, and in any event before the first session of the Tribunal, file an objection that a claim is manifestly without legal 12 Id. para. 6. 13 merit. The party shall specify as precisely as possible the basis for the objection. The Tribunal, after giving the parties the opportunity to present their observations on the objection, shall, at its first session or promptly thereafter, notify the parties of its decision on the objection. The decision of the Tribunal shall be without prejudice to the right of a party to file an objection pursuant to paragraph (1) or to object, in the course of the proceeding, that a claim lacks legal merit.
B. The Rule 41(5) Cases
Four cases have addressed Rule 41(5) to date. A summary of each case follows.
Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
In Trans-Global, the Claimant invested in a petroleum exploration venture in the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan ("Jordan"). When the Claimant discovered oil deposits and informed the Respondent, the Respondent allegedly prevented the Claimant from participating in the development of those deposits, notwithstanding the Claimant's right to do so pursuant to a Production Sharing Agreement between the parties. 17 The Claimant alleged that Jordan's interference violated certain provisions of the United States-Jordan BIT, 18 namely the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment, the prohibition against unreasonable and discriminatory measures, and the obligation to engage in consultations. 19 Jordan raised an objection under Rule 41(5), arguing that the Claimant's case was without legal merit because it alleged a breach of non-existent legal rights of the Claimant or non-existent legal obligations of the Respondent. 20 The Tribunal rejected two out of three of Jordan's claims. 
Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
In this case, the Claimant was an investment adviser that controlled a large number of American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") and shares of a 17 Trans-Global, supra note 2, paras. 10-12. 18 telecommunications company in Venezuela ("CANTV") which it acquired for its clients. Venezuela allegedly offered to purchase all of the ADRs and shares of CANTV at below market value. The Claimant asserted that it was coerced by Venezuela into accepting the offer, and that Venezuela engaged in actions that were tantamount to expropriation by destroying the value of the Claimant's investment without payment of appropriate compensation. 22 Venezuela raised a Rule 41(5) objection, contending that the Claimant had waived and released any claims it may have had against Venezuela in this regard; that the Claimant was not an investor within the meaning of the ICSID Convention, but was merely acting as an agent; and that Venezuela had not violated any duties toward the Claimant. 23 The Tribunal rejected all of Venezuela's objections. The Global and Globex case concerned a Ukrainian program to import and purchase poultry products. Meetings between representatives of the Claimants and Ukrainian parties culminated in the signature of purchase and sale contracts between the two sides. The dispute arose out of Ukraine's alleged failure to pay for or accept delivery of shipments of the products. 25 Ukraine objected under Rule 41(5), arguing that the claims arose from trade transactions in the context of a sale of goods and did not amount to an investment under Article I of the United States-Ukraine BIT or under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.
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The Tribunal upheld Ukraine's objections, finding that the Claimants' claims were manifestly without legal merit. 
RSM Production Corporation and others v. Grenada
The dispute was initially brought to ICSID under the name of RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada ("RSM v. Grenada") and registered on August 5, 2005 as ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14. It concerned contract claims based on allegations that Grenada had unlawfully refused to issue an exploration license to the Claimant, thereby breaching the relevant Petroleum Agreement between the Claimant and Grenada. Finding that RSM's application for the license was submitted after its due date, the Tribunal concluded that Grenada 22 Brandes, supra note 2, paras. 9-17. 23 Id. paras. 19-21. 24 Id. para. 73. 25 Global and Globex, supra note 3, paras. 36-39. 26 Id. para. 41. 27 Id. para. 58.
had not breached the Agreement. RSM subsequently applied for annulment of the Award, and that proceeding is pending.
In early 2010, RSM Production Corporation and its three shareholders brought a new dispute against Grenada, this time under the United StatesGrenada BIT. 28 That case was registered on March 16, 2010 as ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6 ("RSM and others v. Grenada"). Grenada raised a preliminary objection under Rule 41(5), arguing that (1) the predicate of the new claims was that Grenada breached the Petroleum Agreement by refusing to issue the exploration license, yet the Claimants could not prove that Grenada had breached the Agreement since a tribunal had already decided that Grenada had not done so; 29 (2) the claims were subject to the preclusive effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel; 30 (3) the claims were precluded under the fork-in-theroad clause of the BIT; 31 and (4) the claims constituted an abuse of process by attempting to avoid the final and binding effect of the ICSID Award, pursuant to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention. 32 The Tribunal found that each of the Claimants' claims was manifestly without legal merit.
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C. Rule 41(5) in the Context of the ICSID Convention
It is remarkable how well integrated Rule 41(5) is with the rest of the ICSID arbitration system, in particular the ICSID Convention. Indeed, Rule 41(5) forms a harmonious continuum with Article 36(3) of the Convention. That Article provides that "[t]he Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of the information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to register."
The continuum between the Article and the Rule, depicted below, can be discerned from the Centre's Discussion Paper proposing the addition of Rule 41(5) to the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Discussion Paper states:
If . . . the dispute is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, the Secretary-General of ICSID will refuse to register the request and the case will proceed no further . . . . The screening power does not 28 The Treaty between the United States and Grenada Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1986).
29 RSM and others v. Grenada, supra note 3, paras. 4.6.2-4.6.3. 30 Id. paras. 4.6.4-4.6.8. 31 Id. paras. 4.6.9-4.6.14. 32 Id. paras. 4.6.15-4.6.16. 33 Id. para. 9.1.
extend to the merits of the dispute . . . . It might in this context be useful to make clear . . . that the tribunal may at an early stage of the case be asked on an expedited basis to dismiss all or part of the claim.
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This idea finds support in a remark by the Brandes Tribunal that "there are actually three levels at which jurisdictional objections could be examined. First by the Secretariat, and if the case passes that level, it would then be under Rule 41(5), and if it passes that level, it might still be under Rule 41(1)." 35 As a result of this continuum, Arbitration Rule 41(5) may be better understood if discussed in juxtaposition with Article 36(3). There are both similarities and differences between the Rule and the Article. One important similarity is that the purpose of Article 36(3) is to avoid the unnecessary deployment of financial and other resources by parties in cases where a significant flaw that is evident from the initial stage would make it impossible for a case to move forward. 36 Examples of such significant flaws include the absence of consent or non-satisfaction of the requirements of nationality. 37 Likewise, dismissal of a claim for want of legal merit under Rule 41(5) may save the parties tremendous resources. 34 ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 7, paras. 9-10 (footnote omitted). 35 Brandes, supra note 2, para. 53. 36 37 Id. See also Antonio R. Parra, The Screening Power of the ICSID Secretary-General, 2(2) News from ICSID 10, 11 (1985) (Regarding the origin of Article 36, Parra points out that the initial draft of the ICSID Convention did not contain a provision on the screening of requests and that such deficiency caused concern that proceedings could commence even if the consent of a respondent was flawed or lacking.). When a case survives Article 36(3) and undergoes scrutiny under Arbitration Rule 41(5), the review is increasingly substantial and the standard progressively higher. In this regard, Article 36(3) is limited in ways that Rule 41(5) is not, in particular, with respect to the trigger mechanism for review, the powers and functions of the reviewing entity, and materials subject to review.
Continuum of review from
Reviews under Article 36(3) and Arbitration Rule 41(5), respectively, are triggered by different mechanisms, which establish an important procedural distinction between the two provisions. Under Article 36(3), review is automatic, and the ICSID Secretary-General performs it propio motu. Under Rule 41(5), the respondent is the moving party, and its raising of the objection is the trigger for review.
The function of the ICSID Secretary-General under Article 36(3) is narrowly defined. This is what the negative wording of the provision, "not manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre," is meant to capture. According to the Travaux Préparatoires of the ICSID Convention:
It was feared that his [the Secretary-General's] screening power would take the character of a jurisdictional authority. Those fears stemmed from the positive manner in which the second half of [the] Article . . . was worded. [It was] suggested that perhaps a negative wording would better convey the intention of giving to the Secretary-General power for only a formal screening. 38 In contrast, Arbitration Rule 41(5) confers on a tribunal the power to perform a substantive review, with the kind of inquiry and analysis that such review entails, leading to a decision or award.
39 Also, while the screening function of the ICSID Secretary-General under Article 36(3) is limited to jurisdictional questions, the review power of a tribunal under Rule 41(5) covers "unmeritorious claims," which are broader. 40 Parra explains that limiting the Secretary-General's function safeguards the role of tribunals to decide on jurisdiction after considering the evidence. 41 The materials that can be considered by the reviewing entity under either Article 36(3) or Arbitration Rule 41(5) constitute another point of contrast 38 History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II-2, at 774 (ICSID 1968). 39 A decision means that certain issues may be disposed of, and the case continues. An award means all issues are disposed of, and the case ends. 40 See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 7, para. 6 ("As the power of ICSID to deny registration of a request for arbitration is closely circumscribed by the Convention, to cases where the request discloses a manifest lack of jurisdiction, it has also been proposed that there be a procedure for a party to seek from the tribunal, once it is constituted, the dismissal on an expedited basis of an unmeritorious claim."). 41 Parra, The Screening Power of the ICSID Secretary-General, supra note 37, at 12.
between the two provisions. For the ICSID Secretary-General, those materials are limited simply to "information contained in the request" for arbitration. Although, in practice, requesting parties may cure a defect that is remediable by submitting information to supplement their requests, the Secretary-General cannot venture beyond the formal limitations of Article 36(3). 42 A tribunal performing a review under Rule 41(5) has no such limitations. A respondent that raises an objection is expected to corroborate it, giving the opposing party the right to defend its case. Thus, in addition to considering information contained in a request for arbitration, a tribunal reviewing a Rule 41(5) objection can consider observations and supporting evidence from both parties. In this regard, the Global and Globex Tribunal asked, "when can a tribunal properly be satisfied that it is in possession of sufficient materials to decide the matter summarily?" 43 The same Tribunal answered, "[h]ere, a balance evidently has to be struck between the right . . . given to the objecting party . . . to have a patently unmeritorious claim disposed of before unnecessary trouble and expense is incurred in defending it, and the duty of the tribunal to meet the requirements of due process. 
A. Objections to Jurisdiction versus Objections to Merits
The stated purpose of Rule 41(5) was to entitle a respondent to raise preliminary objections on the merits, with a view to obtaining an early dismissal of the case. This was clear even in the wording of the Rule. What was not 42 Id. 43 Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 34. 44 Id. clear from the purpose or text of Rule 41(5) was whether it was also meant for objections to jurisdiction.
The text of the Rule does not contain the term "jurisdiction"; it only mentions "preliminary objections" and specifies that such objections should be in relation to claims that are "manifestly without legal merit." This silence is open to interpretation. For instance, an interpretation that Rule 41(5) permits preliminary objections to jurisdiction would be reasonable because there is no de jure basis to exclude such objections. The relevant provision of the ICSID Institution Rules, 46 Rule 7(e), does not preclude consideration of jurisdictional issues from any stage of a proceeding. Rule 7(e) provides that "the registration of the request is without prejudice to the powers and functions of the . . . Arbitral Tribunal in regard to jurisdiction, competence and the merits."
The articles by Parra and Antonietti support the view that objections to jurisdiction were envisaged under Rule 41(5). Parra wrote that "the power of the Secretariat to refuse registration of arbitration requests is limited to those that disclose a manifest lack of jurisdiction. The Secretariat is powerless to prevent the initiation of proceedings that clear this jurisdictional threshold, but are frivolous as to the merits." 47 This suggests that the concern in introducing Rule 41(5) was less to clarify whether jurisdiction would be dealt with under Rule 41(5), which could well have been presupposed, and more to ensure that there was a mechanism for addressing merits issues as a preliminary matter since the ICSID Secretary-General was powerless to do so under Article 36. Similarly, according to Antonietti, based on the drafting history of Rule 41(5) and discussions at the ICSID Secretariat during the 2006 amendment process, the possibility of objections to jurisdiction being raised under Rule 41(5) was considered and it had "appeared that expedited objections on jurisdiction could not be ruled out of the scope of Rule 41(5)." 48 The conclusion was that "Rule 41(5) does include expedited objections to jurisdiction although it was primarily designed to dismiss frivolous claims on the merits." The question whether objections to jurisdiction are allowed under Rule 41(5) was answered in the affirmative by the Brandes Decision. The Tribunal in that case interpreted Rule 41(5) as covering "all objections" regardless of whether they relate to merits or jurisdiction. 51 Specifically, the Tribunal remarked:
Rule 41(5) does not mention "jurisdiction." The terms employed are "legal merit." This wording, by itself, does not provide a reason why the question whether or not a tribunal has jurisdiction and is competent to hear and decide a claim could not be included in the very general notion that the claim filed is "without legal merit." … There exist no objective reasons why the intent not to burden the parties with a possibly long and costly proceeding when dealing with such unmeritorious claims should be limited to an evaluation of the merits of the case and should not also englobe an examination of the jurisdictional basis on which the tribunal's powers to decide the case rest. 52 On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that "Rule 41(5) therefore allows an early expedited finding if it is manifest that the jurisdiction of the Centre or 50 The Rule 41(5) objection in Trans-Global concerned the merits. 51 Brandes, supra note 2, para. 55. 52 Id. paras. 50, 52. the competence of the Tribunal for the claims brought before the Tribunal is lacking."
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The Global and Globex Award confirmed the Brandes Decision on this point. The Global and Globex Tribunal sustained Ukraine's Rule 41(5) objection and dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. With regard to Ukraine's objection to jurisdiction under the BIT, the Tribunal concluded that "the Claimants' case under [Article I(1)(a)(iii) of the BIT] founders on the fact that their contracts were simply contracts which lacked the essential connecting factor of being 'associated with an investment.'" 54 With regard to Ukraine's objection to jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal concluded that "the sale and purchase contracts entered into by the Claimants are pure commercial transactions that cannot on any interpretation be considered to constitute 'investments' within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention." 55 Brandes and Global and Globex have, for now, put to rest the question of whether an objection under Rule 41(5) can be raised with regard to jurisdiction. The phrase "legal merit" in the text of Rule 41(5) is used in a broad sense and includes issues of jurisdiction and merits. The RSM and others Award, which was issued just nine days after the Global and Globex Award, affirmed this approach, stating that an objection under Article 41(5) "may go to either jurisdiction or the merits."
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B. Does the Award in RSM and others Introduce New Bases for Objections under Rule 41(5)?
If the Brandes Decision and the Global and Globex Award helped to clarify that Rule 41(5) covers objections to jurisdiction, the RSM and others Award introduces entirely new grounds for raising preliminary objections under Rule 41(5).
Grenada did not object to the merits of the Claimants' treaty claims in RSM and others and argued that the Tribunal should not even reach a substantive review of the merits of those claims. Grenada did not object to the jurisdiction of ICSID or competence of the Tribunal either; none of the four pillars of ICSID jurisdiction (materiae, personae, voluntatis, and temporis) was invoked. Rather, Grenada's objection was raised and sustained on the basis of equitable considerations and procedural impediments to the Claimants' case. 53 Id. para. 73. 54 Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 51. 55 Id. para. 57. 56 RSM and others, supra note 3, paras. 4.2.1, 6.1.1-6.1.2.
The Tribunal found for Grenada, concluding that "each of the Claimants' claims is manifestly without legal merit." 57 The Tribunal agreed with Grenada that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied. Whether the issues were litigated under a contract claim or a treaty claim, the rights, questions and facts they involved were decided by the earlier RSM Tribunal, whose decision had a res judicata effect on the case before the RSM and others Tribunal. 58 In that regard, the Tribunal in RSM and others opined, "the present case is no more than an attempt to re-litigate and overturn the findings of another ICSID tribunal" 59 and "[c]laimants' present case is thus no more than a contractual claim (previously decided by an ICSID tribunal which had the jurisdiction to deal with Treaty and contractual issues), dressed up as a Treaty case." 60 Furthermore, the Tribunal pointed out the procedural flaw in submitting the case anew when it would have been more appropriate to have submitted an application for revision of the prior Award in RSM v. Grenada. According to the Tribunal in RSM and others, the new case was "based on allegations . . . that were either known at the time or which ought to have been raised by way of a revision application and over which the Prior Tribunal had jurisdiction."
61 Finally, the Tribunal in RSM and others found that "the initiation of the present arbitration is . . . an improper attempt to circumvent the basic principles set out in Convention Article 53 and the procedures available for revision and rectification of awards provided for in Article 51."
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C. Factual Arguments versus Legal Arguments
Rule 41(5) allows the expedited dismissal of a claim lacking "legal merit." Based on the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the threshold question is whether the qualifier "legal" is meant in contrast to, or to the exclusion of, "factual." In other words, could Rule 41(5) be used to bring a preliminary challenge based on the factual flaws of a case?
The answer, in light of the drafting history of Rule 41(5), appears to be no. At the proposal stage during the 2006 amendment process, the ICSID Secretariat's Working Paper referred only to claims "manifestly without merit," without any qualification. 63 The qualifier "legal" was added later in the version of Rule 41 (5) that was finally adopted in order "to avoid inappropriate discussions on the facts of the case at that stage." 64 This drafting history informed the decision in Trans-Global, where the Tribunal decided that "the adjective 'legal' in Rule 41(5) is clearly used in contradiction to 'factual' given the drafting genesis of Rule 41(5) . . . . Accordingly, it would seem that the tribunal is not concerned, per se, with the factual merits of the Claimants' . . . claims . . . ." 65 Stating it more succinctly, the Tribunal in RSM and others wrote that "an objection under Article 41(5) . . . must raise a legal impediment to a claim, not a factual one."
66 Therefore, the focus of Rule 41(5) is consideration of legal, as opposed to factual, claims for the purpose of assessing dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction or merits.
This does not mean, however, that no discussion of facts could be required. Antonietti recognized that "the question of whether facts and evidentiary issues can be discussed by a tribunal at [the Rule 41(5)] stage [would] be highly debatable." 67 The ultimate question is what balance to strike so that facts are sufficiently yet selectively discussed, not for their intrinsic truth, but to prove or disprove the legal claims which they support. The Trans-Global Tribunal acknowledged that "it is rarely possible to assess the legal merits of any claim without also examining the factual premise upon which that claim is advanced." 68 Considering each side's arguments, the Tribunal found that the ICSID Convention and Rules do not require extensive pleading of a claimant's factual allegations, even after the introduction of Rule 41(5). On the other hand, a claim should be presented with sufficient facts to support its legal merit and allow a Tribunal to perform its review under Rule 41(5). 69 Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded:
In applying Rule 41(5), the Tribunal accepts that, as regards disputed facts relevant to the legal merits of a claimant's claim, the tribunal need not accept at face value any factual allegation which the tribunal regards as (manifestly) incredible, frivolous, vexatious or inaccurate or made in bad faith; nor need a tribunal accept a legal submission dressed up as a factual allegation. The Tribunal does not accept, however, that a tribunal should otherwise weigh the credibility or plausibility of a disputed factual allegation.
The Brandes Tribunal decided the question of whether and to what extent to discuss facts in a Rule 41(5) context along similar lines as the Trans-Global Tribunal. The Brandes Tribunal pointed out three different types of facts, 71 and that the phase of a proceeding dictates the type of facts to be proved as well as the standard of proof that applies.
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• Category 1 Facts: Facts which, if proved, form the basis for jurisdiction. In cases where there are genuine questions about whether a dispute is under the jurisdiction of ICSID and such questions are severable from questions of liability, tribunals generally bifurcate the proceedings to determine jurisdictional questions first. In these instances, Category 1 Facts have to be proved to a higher standard, usually a preponderance of the evidence, whereas other categories of facts are either irrelevant or need only be proved to a lower, prima facie standard.
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• Category 2 Facts: Facts which, if proved, form the basis for liability. At the merits phase, Category 2 Facts have to be proved to a higher standard whereas Category 1 Facts, where relevant, need only be proved prima facie.
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• Category 3 Facts: Facts which, even if proved, form the basis of neither jurisdiction nor merits. These would be facts that are a part of the factual matrix of a case, but proving them would not be material for the Tribunal to arrive at conclusions of law.
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These distinctions led the Brandes Tribunal to conclude that a "[p]reliminary objection under Rule 41(5) is an objection based on the manifest absence of legal merit of a claim, not on the absence of a factual basis. It is therefore not necessary to prove facts, if these facts, even if proven, are not capable of supporting a claim that has no legal merit."
76 While an objection under Rule 41(5) can only challenge the legal basis for claims, deciding the objection often necessarily entails assessing the facts alleged in support of such claims. Therefore, the corollary of the conclusion reached by the Brandes Tribunal is that, in a Rule 41(5) proceeding, facts need to be proven if, by their proof, they defeat the legal claims subject to preliminary challenge. A high standard of proof would apply. 71 I will call these facts "Category 1 Facts," "Category 2 Facts," and "Category 3 Facts." 72 Brandes, supra note 2, para. 65. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 Id. 76 Id. para. 70.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER RULE 41(5)
Rule 41(5) allows a party to file a preliminary objection to any claim alleged in the Request for Arbitration that it considers to be "manifestly without legal merit." In the previous section on the scope of Rule 41(5), the phrase "without legal merit" was discussed in terms of whether the Rule permits a dismissal of cases based on lack of legal, versus factual, merit. In this section, the phrase is discussed with respect to the standard of review tribunals apply when considering Rule 41(5) objections.
A. "Without Legal Merit"
Little guidance is available on the meaning of "without legal merit" as the standard used in Rule 41(5). The jurisprudence on the Rule to date has constructed the meaning of the standard more through case-by-case analysis than by producing a formal definition. For instance, in Trans-Global the Respondent argued that the Claimant's case lacked legal merit because it alleged "non-existent legal rights of the Claimant" or "non-existent legal obligations of the Respondent." 77 The Tribunal nodded to the Respondent's argument by finding that it raised "little difficulty of interpretation."
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It appears, however, that determining whether a case has legal merit is only the second step of an analysis that begins with identifying the theory on which the Rule 41(5) objection is raised, i.e. jurisdictional, merits, or procedural flaw. Once the theory of the objection has been identified, the analysis of whether a claim has "legal merit" in terms of jurisdiction, merits, or procedure is no different in a Rule 41(5) procedure than in normal procedures. In Global and Globex, for example, the Tribunal adopted the classic jurisdiction ratione materiae analysis performed in many ICSID cases, considering the presence of various factors that indicate the existence of an investment. Thus, the Likewise, in RSM and others, the Tribunal concluded that "each of Claimants' claims is manifestly without legal merit" 80 by analyzing the merits of the Claimants' case (expropriation; arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal behavior; breach of international law standard of treatment; full protection and security; and fair and equitable treatment) and determining that it could not revisit these issues which had already been decided by the previous Tribunal.
B. "Manifestly"
The absence of legal merit must be manifest to justify dismissal under Rule 41(5). The requirement that the claim be "manifestly" without legal merit is also founded on due process concerns. The potential to finally dispose of a claim means that "Rule 41(5) can only apply to a clear and obvious case." 81 The meaning of the term "manifestly" is generally unambiguous and uncontroversial. In Trans-Global, the Tribunal first considered the ordinary meaning of the term which it found to be "'palpable,' 'clearly revealed to the eye, mind or judgment,' 'open to view or comprehension,' or 'obvious.'" 82 On surveying uses of the term elsewhere in the ICSID Convention, i.e. Articles 36, 52(1)(b) and 57, the Tribunal found that in each instance the term was used in the same sense as in Rule 41(5). The Tribunal thus concluded:
[T]hese legal materials confirm that the ordinary meaning of the word requires the respondent to establish its objection clearly and obviously, with relative ease and despatch. The standard is thus set high. Given the nature of investment disputes generally, the Tribunal nonetheless recognizes that . . . [t]he exercise may . . . be complicated; but it should never be difficult.
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According to the Tribunal, the meaning of "manifestly" can further be adduced from the general context of Arbitration Rule 41, especially when 79 Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 43. 80 RSM and others, supra note 3, para. 7.2.1. 81 Trans-Global, supra note 2, para. 92. 82 Id. para. 83. 83 Id. para. 88.
contrasting Rule 41(1) and Rule 41(5). Arbitration Rule 41 is titled "Preliminary Objections" and provides at paragraph 1:
Any objection that the dispute or any ancillary claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre or, for other reasons, is not within the competence of the Tribunal shall be made as early as possible. A party shall file the objection with the Secretary-General no later than the expiration of the time limit fixed for the filing of the counter-memorial, or, if the objection relates to an ancillary claim, for the filing of the rejoinder-unless the facts on which the objection is based are unknown to the party at that time. 84 Objections to jurisdiction may be raised under provisions (1) or (5) of Rule 41. Rule 41(1) applies to cases where the lack of jurisdiction is not manifest and requires a normal procedure and full marshalling of the evidence (i.e. written pleadings, hearing with oral arguments, witness examination, expert examination, tribunal deliberations, and a decision or award). Rule 41(5), on the other hand, applies to cases where lack of jurisdiction is manifest. This contrast reinforces the meaning of the term "manifestly" under Rule 41(5).
More interesting than the question of what "manifestly" means is the question of how it translates into a standard for lack of legal merit. The conclusions of the four Tribunals that have considered the question are aligned. According to the Trans-Global Tribunal, "the ordinary meaning of the word requires the respondent to establish its objection clearly and obviously, with relative ease and despatch. The standard is thus set high. . . . The exercise may thus be complicated; but it should never be difficult." 85 The Brandes Tribunal added, "[t]he level of scrutiny of 'manifestly' obviously provides a far higher threshold than the prima facie standard normally applied for jurisdiction under Rule 41(1) where the factual premise for the decision on jurisdiction is normally taken as alleged by the Claimant." 86 In Global and Globex, the Tribunal characterized what was to be understood to be "manifest" as "the central issue" but indicated that the Tribunal had "nothing of its own to add and respectfully endorse [d] . . . [the Trans -Global] analysis and the conclusions reached." 87 Similarly, the Tribunal in RSM and others agreed with the analysis of the Trans-Global and Brandes Tribunals and did not see a reason to "rehash or to seek to supplement their analyses."
These Tribunals made utterly clear that "manifest" is a comparatively high standard. This means that in a Rule 41(5) proceeding, the fact that a claim lacks merit on jurisdiction or on the merits should be proved, such proof should be readily available, and providing it should be a fairly uncomplicated endeavor.
The remaining question is how "manifest" is distinguishable from other high standards such as "preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence." The Trans-Global Tribunal provides some hint. Under the "manifest" standard, a party is expected to prove its case with ease yet do so without engaging in a full marshalling of the evidence before the tribunal. In contrast, under other high standards, the ease or difficulty of proving a case may be irrelevant as long as the evidence, after its full presentation, supports the case.
V. PROCEDURE FOR ADDRESSING AN OBJECTION UNDER RULE 41(5)
Arbitration Rule 41(5) suggests a three-stage expedited procedure, starting with filing the objection, continuing with the presentation of the parties' observations, and ending with the issuance of the tribunal's determination.
A. Overall Timeframes
Rule 41(5) only offers general guidance on the timing of each stage of the procedure. The objection should be raised within 30 days after the constitution of a tribunal and, in any event, before a tribunal holds its first session. 89 Rule 41(5) provides that the parties shall have an opportunity to present observations on the objection, but does not specify time limits for submitting those observations. Finally, the determination of the tribunal is to be rendered at the first session or shortly thereafter. Again, the formulation provides a time reference in relation to which the tribunal's determination is to be issued but gives no specific timing. The notion that emerges from the foregoing is that, ideally, the objection is to be raised and decided early, before the parties take any steps in the normal procedures should the dispute survive the objection.
The general guidance found in Rule 41(5) gives tribunals discretion to set specific timeframes for the procedure based on Article 44 of the ICSID 89 Arbitration Rule 13 requires a first session to be held within 60 days of a tribunal's constitution. However, the 60 days can be extended by agreement of the parties, although not indefinitely. Convention. Article 44 provides, "[i]f any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question." A tribunal's authority to set specific procedural timeframes in these circumstances is confirmed by Antonietti, who writes that the task of establishing a more specific timeframe for the expedited process under Rule 41(5) "was left to the tribunals to determine on an ad hoc basis." 90 In setting specific timeframes for proceedings under Rule 41(5), it is important to bear in mind the overriding principle of expeditiousness embedded in the Rule. In that regard, Christoph Schreuer et al. comment, "[t]he procedure under this provision is considerably accelerated as compared to proceedings triggered by an objection to jurisdiction." 91 For additional guidance, the table on the following page provides the timeframes within which the Rule 41(5) objections have been dealt with in the case law thus far. Counting from the time the objection was raised until each Tribunal's determination was rendered, the procedure lasted 2 ½ months in TransGlobal, 45 days in Brandes, 11 months in Global and Globex, and a little over 4 months in RSM and others.
B. Written and Oral Procedures
Rule 41(5) only requires that the parties have "the opportunity to present their observations on the objection." The Rule does not specify whether that opportunity should be in the form of a written procedure or an oral procedure, or both. There is the further question of how many rounds of observations are appropriate. This is another instance where tribunals faced with Rule 41(5) objections exercise discretion and deal with issues on an ad hoc basis, deriving authority from Article 44 of the ICSID Convention.
Based on Rule 41(5) practice to date, there may be a written procedure and an oral procedure. The written procedure may consist of one round of observations (Brandes, RSM and others) or two (Trans-Global, Global and Globex). Arguably, the ease with which a respondent is able to prove the absence of legal merit, and the ease with which a claimant is able to defend its case, would factor into whether one or two rounds of written observations are warranted. Although having two rounds may lengthen the process, the 90 Antonietti, supra note 45, at 441. 91 If the claimant's factual allegations were to be tested by the tribunal requiring oral testimony to be adduced by either party, it is difficult to conceive in practice how the strict timetable imposed by Article 41(5) could be met. Moreover, now if the claimant's factual allegation required any rebuttal, it would tend to show that the allegation would survive an objection under Rule 41(5); and, conversely, the reverse if the allegation needed testimony to supplement or support it.
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No oral procedure is required under Rule 41(5). Parties may seek an oral procedure, especially in instances where the only other time they addressed the tribunal on the objection was in a single round of written observations. Tribunals may welcome an oral procedure to satisfy themselves and the parties that the latter were provided adequate opportunity to fully present their case. The concern here is due process. In this regard, the Trans-Global Tribunal wrote:
[A] respondent's objection under Rule 41(5) may produce an ICSID award finally disposing of the claimant's claims, with all its attendant legal effects under the ICSID Convention, the New york Arbitration Convention and national legislation . . . . It would therefore be a grave injustice if a claimant was wrongly driven from the judgment seat by a final award under Article 41(5), with no opportunity to develop and present its case under the written and oral procedures . . . .
93
The fact that a tribunal can hold its first session in person and that the Rule 41(5) oral procedure can take place at the session makes having an oral procedure practical and convenient. So far, this has been the experience in all the Rule 41(5) cases.
C. Decision of the Tribunal
Without providing any specific timelines, Rule 41(5) nonetheless makes clear the diligence with which a tribunal is expected to work to render 92 Trans-Global, supra note 2, para. 91. 93 Id. para. 92. See also Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 33 ("[I]n principle, it would not be right to non-suit a claimant . . . without having allowed the claimant (and therefore the respondent as well) a proper opportunity to be heard, both in writing and orally."). its determination, "at the first session or promptly thereafter." 94 In TransGlobal, Brandes, and RSM and others, the Tribunals rendered their decisions promptly after the first session. In Global and Globex, the process took longer to complete. However, the Tribunal in that case acknowledged that there was a delay and explained that it was due to "extraneous reasons." 95 The Tribunal noted that it deemed the delay "inevitable and still within the spirit of the Rules."
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A practical implication flowing from the requirement to make a prompt determination under Rule 41(5) is that the tribunal may wish to complete preliminary deliberations, based on the parties' written observations, before holding the oral procedure. Having preliminarily deliberated before the oral procedure, the Rule 41(5) tribunal could use the oral procedure as an opportunity to seek elucidation from the parties on points that raise questions in the minds of arbitrators.
Of course, whether a tribunal decides to uphold or reject a Rule 41(5) objection affects the promptness with which it is able to discharge its duties. 97 Rejecting the objection means that the proceeding moves forward and the respondent is not barred from raising the same objection later. The ICSID Secretariat's Discussion Paper states, in that regard, that "a request for [preliminary dismissal under Rule 41(5)] would be without prejudice to the further objections a party might make, if the request were denied." 98 Likewise, the Global and Globex Tribunal explains that "if an objection is not upheld at the Rule 41(5) stage, the rights of the objecting party remain intact."
99 Upholding the objection, on the other hand, means the end of the road for the claimant and the issuance of an award by the tribunal. An award must observe the criteria set out in Article 48 of the ICSID Convention, e.g. it must deal with every question submitted and state the reasons on which it is based. A decision requires less elaboration and, in theory, less time to produce. 94 See also Onwuamaegbu, supra note 89, at 50. 95 Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 33. 96 Id. 97 Antonietti writes that "[i]f a tribunal is not able to decide upon the objection raised on an expedited basis, namely if it is not manifest to the tribunal that there is no legal merit, or if the tribunal cannot do so within the prescribed time limit, or if it appears to the tribunal that given the factual record the objection is not ripe, the proceeding will continue." Antonietti, supra note 45, at 440. 98 ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 7, para. 10. 99 Global and Globex, supra note 3, para. 33 (footnote omitted).
VI. CONCLUSION
The clearest feature of Rule 41(5) is that it is designed for objections for manifest lack of legal merit. It is perhaps ironic that so far no case has been dismissed on the merits under Rule 41(5).
Arbitration Rule 41(5) was introduced in 2006 and, so far, only four cases have tested it. Though few, these cases have contributed to a better understanding of various aspects of the Rule-for instance, whether the Rule is open to objections to jurisdiction; whether the grounds for objecting under the Rule are limited to jurisdiction and merits; or whether factual impediments can be fatal to a case. The harder question, however, is the one regarding the standard of review that applies under the Rule. The four Tribunals that have examined and applied the Rule treaded lightly with the question, and it is not clear that they have exhausted the analysis. Broadly, manifest lack of legal merit puts at issue the viability of a claim for reasons of jurisdiction, merits, or procedure. To succeed under the standard, a respondent must show that a claim is untenable in a way that is evident and easily proved.
